An Atlas of Money · All entries
Russian barter and veksels
Attested Disputed
Open on the mapBarter rose from 7% of Russian industrial sales in 1992 to a 54% peak in August 1998 and then fell back; firm IOUs (veksels), debt swaps and tax offsets served as payment. The paper links barter to tight money and credit rationing, not hyperinflation.
No state involved
A claim on an issuer
Claims and evidence
Barter rose from 7% of Russian industrial sales in 1992 to a 54% peak in August 1998 and then fell back; firm IOUs (veksels), debt swaps and tax offsets served as payment. The paper links barter to tight money and credit rationing, not hyperinflation. Attested Disputed
Contested by Explanations differ: liquidity shortage and tight monetary policy (Commander, Dolinskaya & Mumssen 2000; Noguera 2004) vs. tax evasion and a 'virtual economy' that props up loss-making firms (Gaddy & Ickes 1998; Hendley, Ickes & Ryterman 2000).
“barter in industrial sales grew in Russia from 7% of total transactions in 1992 and reached a 54% peak in August 1998, exactly one month before the collapse of the ruble in September 1998”
José Noguera, The Transmission Mechanism to Barter, CERGE-EI Working Paper 243 (2004), p. 2-3 and Fig. 1(a)