An Atlas of Money · All entries

Chicago Plan for 100% reserve money

Law & text · 1933 – 1935 · Chicago (University of Chicago)

Attested

Open on the map

In 1933, University of Chicago economists (Knight, Mints, Schultz, Simons and others) proposed in memoranda to abolish fractional-reserve banking and impose 100% reserves on demand deposits.

Authored in Washington, DC (IMF). Kept at the Chicago node because it revisits the 1933 plan. Fisher's four claims are cited from Fisher (1936). Section 209 of the Banking Act of 1935 'effectively prohibited any move to raise reserve requirements to 100%' (Phillips). Senator Cutting's bill (S. 2204, 1935) and Senator Nye's amendment (defeated 10-59) followed. The first memorandum was circulated on 16 March 1933 to about 40 people. An expanded memorandum followed in November 1933. The 2012 IMF model revisits the plan; it is cited as a claim.

Claims and evidence

In 1933, University of Chicago economists (Knight, Mints, Schultz, Simons and others) proposed in memoranda to abolish fractional-reserve banking and impose 100% reserves on demand deposits. Attested

Contested by Rejected in practice: Congress chose federal deposit insurance (1933) and the Banking Act of 1935, which capped reserve requirements and so barred 100% reserves (Phillips 1992).

Federal deposit insurance cut bank failures from about 4,000 in 1933 to 61 in 1934, removing the urgency for 100% reserves. The Banking Act of 1935 capped reserve requirements at twice the 1935 level. Attested Little disputed

Contested by Defenders of the plan (Phillips 1992; Benes and Kumhof 2012) say deposit insurance shifted risk to taxpayers.

An IMF working paper by Benes and Kumhof (2012) models the Chicago Plan in a calibrated DSGE model of the US. It finds support for all four of Fisher's claimed benefits, including the elimination of bank runs, with output gains approaching 10%. Supported Strongly disputed

Contested by Model result, not evidence. The paper 'should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF'. Fractional-reserve and banking-school critics dispute the costs of transition and the loss of bank credit creation (no critique was fetched here).