An Atlas of Money · All entries

Panic of 1819

Credit & ledger · 1815 – 1822 · Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Supported Little disputed

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The Second Bank's notes and deposits fell from $21.9 million in June 1818 to $11.5 million a year later, a 47% contraction.

Role of the state Private, under state licence or control

Whose debt A claim on an issuer

Fed History gives a similar sequence (expansion under Jones, contraction under Cheves). Disagreement is low on mechanism and higher on blame. Precision is state-level; Rothbard does not name the banks. Rothbard cites his own Panic of 1819 (1962), p. 62. Rothbard puts the total money supply at $103.5 million in 1818 and $74.2 million in 1819 (-28.3%). Anchored at the Bank's Philadelphia head office; the crisis was nationwide. Calomiris & Gorton (1991, Table 4.1) date the panic April-May 1819. Timing difference: Rothbard dates the contraction from July 1818 under Jones; Fed History stresses Cheves (president from 1819).

Claims and evidence

The Second Bank's notes and deposits fell from $21.9 million in June 1818 to $11.5 million a year later, a 47% contraction. Supported Little disputed

Austrian reading: 1819 was the first nationwide boom-bust cycle, driven by the Second Bank's inflation and then its contraction. Supported Little disputed

Contested by Hill (Federal Reserve History) n.d.

Central-bank-history reading: after 1819 Cheves halved the Bank's notes in circulation, cut loans and foreclosed on mortgages, and many state banks failed. Supported Little disputed

Contested by Rothbard 2002

State tolerance: in June 1819 North Carolina's three leading banks, backed by the state, agreed to refuse specie to money brokers. Their notes fell to a 15% discount outside the state. Supported