An Atlas of Money · All entries
Panic of 1907: Knickerbocker Trust and J.P. Morgan's rescue
Attested
Open on the mapOn Friday, October 18, 1907, news that Knickerbocker Trust's president Charles T. Barney was an associate of Morse set off a run on Knickerbocker.
Private, under state licence or control
A claim on an issuer

Claims and evidence
On Friday, October 18, 1907, news that Knickerbocker Trust's president Charles T. Barney was an associate of Morse set off a run on Knickerbocker. Attested
“On Friday, October 18, news broke that the president of Knickerbocker Trust, Charles T. Barney, was an associate of Morse.8 The news sparked a run on Knickerbocker.”
Moen, Jon R. & Ellis W. Tallman. n.d. 'The Panic of 1907.' Federal Reserve History (federalreservehistory.org)
Knickerbocker suspended on October 22, 1907 after depositors had withdrawn nearly $8 million. It reopened in March 1908 with $2.4 million of new capital. Attested
“The next day, after depositors had withdrawn nearly $8 million, it suspended operations.”
Moen, Jon R. & Ellis W. Tallman. n.d. 'The Panic of 1907.' Federal Reserve History (federalreservehistory.org)
J.P. Morgan kept the NYSE open by raising cash from large institutions and delivering it to the exchange's loan post. Attested Little disputed
“The New York Stock Exchange remained open largely because of the legendary actions of Morgan, who solicited cash from large financial and industrial institutions and then had it delivered directly to the loan post at the exchange to support brokers who were willing to extend credit.”
Moen, Jon R. & Ellis W. Tallman. n.d. 'The Panic of 1907.' Federal Reserve History (federalreservehistory.org)
Austrian reading: after 1907 bankers wanted a central bank to bail them out and make money elastic: 'a federal governmental Santa Claus'. Supported Disputed
Contested by Moen & Tallman (Federal Reserve History) n.d.
“A central bank, they believed, was needed to provide a lender of last resort, a federal governmental Santa Claus who would always stand ready to bail out banks in trouble.”
Rothbard, Murray N. 1983. The Mystery of Banking. New York: Richardson & Snyder, p. 231
Sound-money (Griffin) reading: 1907 convinced Wall Street that competition had to be replaced by a national cartel backed by government fiat money. Weak lead Disputed
Contested by Moen & Tallman (Federal Reserve History) n.d.
“It became clear that two changes had to be made: all remnants of banking competition now had to be totally eliminated and replaced by a national cartel”
Griffin, G. Edward. 1998. The Creature from Jekyll Island. 3rd ed. Westlake Village, CA: American Media, pp. 436-437 (approx.)
Opposing reading: the panic ran mainly through trust companies outside the Clearing House. That changed Clearing House bankers' view of a central bank, and the trusts were like 2007-09 shadow banks. Supported Disputed
Contested by Rothbard 2002; Griffin 1998
“Moen and Tallman (1999) argued that the experience of the Panic of 1907 changed how New York Clearing House bankers perceived the value of a central bank because the panic took hold mainly among trust companies, institutions outside their membership.”
Moen, Jon R. & Ellis W. Tallman. n.d. 'The Panic of 1907.' Federal Reserve History (federalreservehistory.org)