An Atlas of Money · All entries

Panic of 1907: Knickerbocker Trust and J.P. Morgan's rescue

Credit & ledger · 1907 – 1908 · New York City (Wall Street district)

Attested

Open on the map

On Friday, October 18, 1907, news that Knickerbocker Trust's president Charles T. Barney was an associate of Morse set off a run on Knickerbocker.

Role of the state Private, under state licence or control

Whose debt A claim on an issuer

Crowd on Wall Street during the Panic of 1907
Crowd on Wall Street during the Panic of 1907 — Unknown author Unknown author, Public domain

Both readings agree 1907 drove the creation of the Fed. They disagree on whether the cause was fractional-reserve inflation plus banker self-interest, or a gap in lender-of-last-resort coverage. Griffin draws on Kolko, Triumph of Conservatism. Morgan at first refused aid after Benjamin Strong could not certify Knickerbocker's solvency. Neither local Austrian text covers Knickerbocker or the Morgan rescue; the event details come from Moen & Tallman (Fed History). Rothbard 2002 (p. 240) says the same: opinion 'consolidated on behalf of a central bank... to bail banks out of trouble.' Rothbard adds that the major New York and Chicago banks were allowed by government to suspend specie payments (Rothbard 2002, p. 240). On October 26, NY Clearing House banks restricted cash convertibility and issued loan certificates. Sta

Claims and evidence

On Friday, October 18, 1907, news that Knickerbocker Trust's president Charles T. Barney was an associate of Morse set off a run on Knickerbocker. Attested

Knickerbocker suspended on October 22, 1907 after depositors had withdrawn nearly $8 million. It reopened in March 1908 with $2.4 million of new capital. Attested

J.P. Morgan kept the NYSE open by raising cash from large institutions and delivering it to the exchange's loan post. Attested Little disputed

Austrian reading: after 1907 bankers wanted a central bank to bail them out and make money elastic: 'a federal governmental Santa Claus'. Supported Disputed

Contested by Moen & Tallman (Federal Reserve History) n.d.

Sound-money (Griffin) reading: 1907 convinced Wall Street that competition had to be replaced by a national cartel backed by government fiat money. Weak lead Disputed

Contested by Moen & Tallman (Federal Reserve History) n.d.

Opposing reading: the panic ran mainly through trust companies outside the Clearing House. That changed Clearing House bankers' view of a central bank, and the trusts were like 2007-09 shadow banks. Supported Disputed

Contested by Rothbard 2002; Griffin 1998