An Atlas of Money · All entries
Roman-law irregular deposit (depositum irregulare)
Supported Strongly disputed
Open on the mapIn the Roman-law irregular deposit of fungible goods such as money, the depositary did not have to return the same coins, but did have to keep an equal quantity and quality (the tantundem) constantly available to the depositor; misuse was treated as theft.
Claims and evidence
In the Roman-law irregular deposit of fungible goods such as money, the depositary did not have to return the same coins, but did have to keep an equal quantity and quality (the tantundem) constantly available to the depositor; misuse was treated as theft. Supported Strongly disputed
Contested by Mainstream civil- and common-law doctrine treats a money deposit as a mutuum (loan) that passes ownership to the banker, e.g. Foley v. Hill (1848), quoted by Huerta de Soto himself; Selgin and White (1996) reject the claim that Roman-law tradition binds modern demand-deposit contracts. Roberds and Velde (2014) note that Taula de Canvi deposits, being 'tantundem eiusdem generis', were 'legally closer to the loan contract than the strict deposit contract'.
“The essential obligation of depositaries is to maintain the tantundem constantly available to depositors.”
Huerta de Soto, J. 2006 [Spanish orig. 1998]. Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, trans. M. A. Stroup. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Ch. 1-2 (Digest 16.3; 47.2).
Ulpian (Digest 16.3.7.2) records that, when bankers failed, depositors of money were paid before other privileged creditors, while those who had taken interest were treated as lenders, not depositors. Attested Little disputed
Contested by That depositors had priority is not disputed. Whether this shows a 100%-reserve duty, or only a bankruptcy rule, is the point in dispute (Selgin and White 1996 contra Huerta de Soto).
“Whenever bankers are declared bankrupt, usually addressed first are the concerns of the depositors; that is, those with money on deposit, not those earning interest on money left with the bankers.”
Huerta de Soto, J. 2006 [Spanish orig. 1998]. Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, trans. M. A. Stroup. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Ch. 2 (Digest 16.3.7.2, Ulpian).
The opposing doctrine, which prevailed in English common law, holds that money deposited with a banker becomes the banker's property and that the banker owes only a debt of an equal sum (Lord Cottenham, Foley v. Hill, 1848). Attested Strongly disputed
Contested by Huerta de Soto (1998) calls this the 'mistaken doctrine of common law'. Rothbard (1983, 1994) contrasts it with grain-warehouse law, where misusing fungible deposits was held fraudulent.
“the money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of the banker, to do with it as he pleases.”
Huerta de Soto, J. 2006 [Spanish orig. 1998]. Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, trans. M. A. Stroup. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Ch. 3 (quoting Foley v. Hill, 1848).
Free-banking theorists Selgin and White reply that the Roman-law custodial deposit is one contract among several, and that parties may freely contract demand deposits as debts rather than warehouse receipts. Supported Strongly disputed
Contested by Huerta de Soto (1998), Hoppe (1994), Hülsmann (1996): such contracts are legally impossible or fraudulent.
“who regards the 100 percent reserve custodial deposit as a form consecrated by the Roman Law tradition, and who would (it seems) deny transactors the freedom to make alternative (non-traditional) demand deposit contracts”
Selgin, G. A. and L. H. White. 1996. 'In Defense of Fiduciary Media, or, We are Not Devo(lutionists), We are Misesians!' Review of Austrian Economics 9(2): 83-107.