An Atlas of Money · All entries
Cuba: the peso, the end of the CUC and state dollarisation
Attested
Open on the mapDecreto-Ley 17/2020, published 10 December 2020, ordered monetary and exchange unification from 1 January 2021 and withdrawal of the convertible peso (CUC) within 180 days, after which the CUC lost legal tender; the Cuban peso (CUP) became the sole legal tender, with foreign-currency payment only where authorised.
Imposed by the state
Issued, redeemable for nothing
Claims and evidence
Decreto-Ley 17/2020, published 10 December 2020, ordered monetary and exchange unification from 1 January 2021 and withdrawal of the convertible peso (CUC) within 180 days, after which the CUC lost legal tender; the Cuban peso (CUP) became the sole legal tender, with foreign-currency payment only where authorised. Attested
“Artículo 2.1. A partir del día primero de enero del año 2021 se dispone la unificación monetaria y cambiaria. 2. Se retira de la circulación el peso convertible en el plazo de ciento ochenta (180) días, contados a partir de la unificación monetaria y cambiaria.”
Consejo de Estado, Decreto-Ley 17/2020 'De la Implementación del Proceso de Ordenamiento Monetario', Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba No. 68 Extraordinaria, 10 Dec 2020 (GOC-2020-779-EX68)
The official enterprise rate moved from 1 CUP to 24 CUP per US dollar (a 2,300% devaluation); Mesa-Lago notes that at end-2020 the CUC traded on the black market at 1.50-1.80 per dollar, i.e. 36-43 CUP, so the new peso was overvalued from the start. Supported Little disputed
Contested by Government position (Decreto-Ley 17/2020 art. 7, quoted by Mesa-Lago): the rate is set by the BCC and published daily; officials kept the fixed 24 rate as a nominal anchor against inflation.
“El CUP está sobrevaluado: si a fines de 2020 se cambiaba en el mercado negro entre 1,50 y 1,80 por dólar, esto equivalía a entre 36 y 43 CUP en vez de la tasa oficial de 24.”
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo 2021. La unificación monetaria y cambiaria en Cuba: normas, efectos, obstáculos y perspectivas. Real Instituto Elcano, Documento de trabajo 2/2021, 5 Feb 2021
From October 2019 the state opened 77 stores selling first durable goods, later basic necessities, only against magnetic cards backed by dollars (Resolución 73/2019); this foreign-currency card circuit, MLC, became the main channel of partial dollarisation after the CUC ended. Supported Little disputed
“(c) se abrieron en octubre de 2019 77 tiendas que inicialmente vendían (con tarjetas magnéticas respaldadas por dólares) sólo bienes de “alta gama”, como motocicletas y autos12 (Resolución 73/2019), aunque después se extendió a los bienes de primera necesidad;”
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo 2021. La unificación monetaria y cambiaria en Cuba. Real Instituto Elcano DT 2/2021, sec. 2.6
By early 2025 MLC balances were less and less backed by real foreign currency and MLC stores had emptied; MLC traded at about 240 CUP against 340 CUP for a cash dollar, and the state opened stores taking only cash dollars, foreign cards and the Tarjeta Clásica. In December 2025 the BCC resolution regulating MLC accounts (222/2021) was repealed in a new foreign-currency package. Weak lead Little disputed
Contested by Official framing (Granma, as reported by Cuba Heute): partial dollarisation is temporary, meant to dry up the informal market, with de-dollarisation as the long-term goal.
“The MLC was ultimately a failed attempt to prevent the politically sensitive and undesirable dollarization.”
Cuba Heute (blog/journalism), 'New foreign currency supermarket: From MLC back to the US dollar', Jan 2025
A Havana supermarket opened in early 2025 as the first since the 1990s to accept only foreign currency: cash US dollars, other foreign currencies, international cards and the Tarjeta Clásica; state media described such dollar sales as centrally approved exceptions. Weak lead Little disputed
Contested by Government (Granma, via Cuba Heute) presents it as a temporary step toward de-dollarisation; critics stress the social cost for households without access to dollars.
“at the beginning of the month, a supermarket opened in Havana for the first time since the 1990s that only accepts foreign currency.”
Cuba Heute (blog/journalism), 'New foreign currency supermarket: From MLC back to the US dollar', Jan 2025
OnCuba's December 2025 analysis says partial dollarisation began in 2019 with MLC stores and the new decree-law and resolutions expand it, while forbidding private firms (MSMEs) to sell to the public in dollars without authorisation. Weak lead Little disputed
“Second, internal foreign currency transactions are not new, nor is the policy of partial dollarization. This process began in 2019 with the first stores selling goods in freely convertible currency (MLC) for “medium and high-end” items.”
OnCuba Staff, 'Practical impacts of latest partial dollarization measures in Cuba', OnCubaNews English, 26 Dec 2025
BCC Resolution 215/2021 (Gaceta 73 Extraordinaria, 26 Aug 2021) allows the central bank to authorise use of particular virtual assets and license providers for 'socio-economic interest'; firms may use them only with authorisation, while individuals bear the risk of unauthorised assets, though transactions among them are not prohibited. Attested Little disputed
Contested by Readings differ: some press called it a green light; the text itself is restrictive, allowing use only by licence and warning of civil, administrative and penal consequences.
“activos virtuales que funcionan al margen del Sistema Bancario y Financiero, aun cuando no están prohibidas las transacciones con activos virtuales entre dichas personas.”
Banco Central de Cuba, Resolución 215/2021, Gaceta Oficial No. 73 Extraordinaria, 26 Aug 2021 (GOC-2021-814-EX73)