An Atlas of Money · All entries
Clearinghouse loan certificates (1857-1914)
Supported
Open on the mapIn panics, member banks pledged collateral to the clearing-house committee for loan certificates used in clearing. In later panics, clearing houses other than New York's also issued them to the public in small denominations.
No state involved
A claim on an issuer
Claims and evidence
In panics, member banks pledged collateral to the clearing-house committee for loan certificates used in clearing. In later panics, clearing houses other than New York's also issued them to the public in small denominations. Supported
“Member banks could deposit specified collateral with a clearing house committee and receive loan certificates that could be used in the clearing process and in later panics were also handed out to the public in small denominations (from clearing houses other than the New York Clearing House).”
Gorton, Gary & Ellis W. Tallman. 2016. 'How Did Pre-Fed Banking Panics End?' NBER Working Paper 22036
Dating: loan certificates in their classic form were first issued in 1860. The 1857 'Metropolitan certificates' were a comparable but different liability. Supported
“Clearing house loan certificates in the form we discuss were first issued in 1860 -- see Swanson (1908a,b). Redlich (1947) discusses the issuance of “Metropolitan certificates” in 1857 as a comparable liquidity vehicle, but the nature of the liability is sufficiently different to warrant a separate denotation.”
Gorton, Gary & Ellis W. Tallman. 2016. 'How Did Pre-Fed Banking Panics End?' NBER Working Paper 22036
Opposing (Gorton) reading: in panics the clearing house acted as a lender of last resort, issuing private money and providing deposit insurance. Certificates were joint liabilities that legally united members into a single entity. Supported Disputed
Contested by Griffin 1998; Rothbard 2002
“These institutions not only cleared interbank liabilities but, in response to banking panics, they acted as lenders of last resort, issuing private money and providing deposit insurance.”
Calomiris, Charles W. & Gary Gorton. 1991. 'The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation.' In R.G. Hubbard (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises, NBER/Univ. of Chicago Press, 109-174, p. 119
Gorton & Huang: private bank coalitions can act as central banks, but government central banks and deposit insurance historically replaced them. Supported Disputed
Contested by Griffin 1998
“Gorton and Huang (2001) argue that private coalitions of banks can act as central banks, issuing private money and providing deposit insurance during times of panic.”
Gorton, Gary & Lixin Huang. 2002. 'Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking.' NBER Working Paper 9137
Sound-money (Griffin) reading: clearing-house 'script' in 1907 had partial success but no legal foundation. Aldrich-Vreeland (1908) legalized it, and the legal version was used only in 1914. Weak lead Disputed
Contested by Calomiris & Gorton 1991; Gorton & Tallman 2016
“Script had been used by the bank clearing houses during the panic of 1907 with partial success, but it had been a bold experiment with no legal foundation.”
Griffin, G. Edward. 1998. The Creature from Jekyll Island. 3rd ed. Westlake Village, CA: American Media, pp. 436-437 (approx.)
Austrian reading of private clearing: the Suffolk system showed that competing private banks can run efficient, safe, inexpensive clearinghouses that limit overissue. Supported Little disputed
“While it lasted, though, the Suffolk banking system showed that it is possible in a free-market system to have private banks competing to establish themselves as efficient, safe, and inex- pensive clearinghouses limiting overissue of paper money.”
Rothbard, Murray N. 2002. A History of Money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, p. 122